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INTRODUCTION 
Plea bargaining, an element of the criminal justice system since the 
1800s, has become increasingly central to criminal proceedings over the 
past forty years.  In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court recognized 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2014; M.A., Fuller 
Theological Seminary, 2011, 2006; B.A., Clemson University, 2003.  I am grateful for the 
editorial assistance and support provided by Kelsey B. Shust, Elizabeth Cartwright, Sharon 
Makowsky, James Crowley, Dan Faichney, Matt Lasky, Ilan Peress, and the members of the 
Journal’s editorial staff who reviewed this piece prior to publication. 
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the problems associated with the mass volume of cases in the legal system.1  
The Court noted the resulting effects on overworked attorneys and judges, 
as well as the pressure those case volumes put on attorneys to clear cases 
from a docket without giving adequate attention to the defendant standing 
before the court.2  These challenges have only increased in the years since, 
and the practice of plea bargaining has become increasingly prevalent as an 
effort to administer justice more fairly and efficiently.3  Nearly 95% of all 
criminal cases in state court systems are resolved without going to trial, and 
the percentage of pleas defendants enter in federal court is even higher.4  In 
the majority opinion of Missouri v. Frye, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
approvingly quoted two scholars who remarked that plea bargaining “is not 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”5  Many commentators have criticized plea bargaining, with some 
calling for its abolition.6  Irrespective of their concerns, plea bargaining has 
become entrenched in the criminal justice system, which depends on plea 
bargaining at both the state and federal levels.7  Plea bargaining’s place in 
the criminal justice system can be explained by its effectiveness in 
efficiently resolving cases: it allows for cases to be resolved promptly, 
which is all the more important when both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys are assigned a significantly greater volume of cases than any one 
attorney can competently manage.  The Supreme Court has recognized plea 
bargaining’s importance, enshrining its place in the system by denoting it as 
 
1 407 U.S. 25, 34–36 (1972). 
2 Id. 
3 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); see also Donald G. Gifford, 
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 37, 37; Ana Maria Gutiérrez, Note, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of 
Plea Bargaining in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 713 
(2010). 
4 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (tracing 94% of state court convictions and 97% of federal 
court convictions back to guilty pleas). 
5 Id. at 1407 (citing Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
6 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299 
(2006); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, How the Germans Do It, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 204, 205 (1979) (arguing that the procedural safeguards built into the German 
system effectively rendered plea bargains unnecessary in pre-unification West Germany, 
demonstrating that plea bargaining is not inexorable); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (arguing that plea agreements 
undercut the interests of all parties involved, that incremental reforms are inadequate, and 
that plea bargaining should be abolished completely). 
7 Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea 
Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 1029, 1030 n.6 (2011); see also Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea 
Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717 (2006). 
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a stage where a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel can result in habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective 
counsel.8 
The Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. 
Cooper clarify the specific nature of the relief available when a defense 
attorney fails to communicate a plea bargain or gives defective legal advice, 
encouraging a trial that results in a conviction and a significantly more 
severe sentence than offered in a plea.9  In Frye and Lafler, the Supreme 
Court reinstated plea offers after the defendants successfully claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The dissents in both cases predict that the 
Court’s chosen remedy could result in further constitutional litigation with 
respect to plea bargaining, and that rather than solving a problem, the Court 
created a new field of litigation.10 
This Comment explores the ripple effects that Frye and Lafler will 
have on both prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the possibility that 
reinstating plea offers will result in increased constitutional litigation.  This 
Comment argues that the holdings in Frye and Lafler supply a means for 
encouraging prosecution-focused reform efforts and for curtailing practices 
of overcharging defendants and using so-called exploding offers.  
Legislative remedies should address the underfunding of both public 
defender organizations and prosecutors.11  Future litigation should focus on 
guaranteeing that plea offers remain available after first appearances.  
Together, these efforts will ensure that defendants are able to exercise their 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Part I provides background information on the extension of the right to 
counsel from the trial to other critical stages of criminal proceedings.  
Specifically, it focuses on cases involving plea bargaining, as well as 
seminal cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel.  After 
introducing these concepts, the Comment looks more carefully at Missouri 
v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, in which the Supreme Court clarified the 
remedy available to defendants granted habeas relief because of counsel 
ineffectiveness during plea bargaining. 
Part II focuses on several of the root causes of ineffective counsel, 
namely overcriminalization, excessive caseloads, and the institutional 
cultures of prosecutorial teams and public defender offices.  These issues 
 
8 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
9 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1376 (2012). 
10 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
11 Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 
299–300 (2011). 
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help explain the practices of overcharging defendants and extending 
exploding offers, and the effects they have on agents within the emerging 
plea bargaining market. 
Part III charts several possible paths that litigation challenging these 
practices could take, with an eye towards eventual reforms.12  Further, it 
suggests the potential implications Frye and Lafler could have upon the 
plea bargaining process.  It looks first at how Frye and Lafler could directly 
affect defense attorneys and prosecutors, and then it forecasts possible 
litigation that could bring about specific reforms within the plea bargaining 
process, such as some of the challenges mentioned in Part II. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CRITICAL STAGES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees assistance of counsel for those 
accused of criminal offenses.13  Since the Amendment’s passage in the 
eighteenth century, the doctrine of assistance of counsel has evolved to 
accommodate developments within the criminal justice system14 and the 
establishment of new forms of police procedure.  As part of the 
development of this area of law, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama 
recognized that the rights of those accused of criminal offenses do not 
attach only at trial and that deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes a 
due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.15  Indeed, there are 
earlier, critical stages of criminal proceedings during which the absence of 
counsel could cause substantial prejudice to the accused, who thus has a 
constitutional right to counsel at these stages.16 
In Massiah v. United States, the Court held that when an indicted 
defendant had retained counsel, government agents could not elicit 
statements outside of counsel’s presence.17  The Court reversed Massiah’s 
conviction on the grounds that the government improperly arranged a 
meeting between the indicted defendant and a cooperative codefendant 
 
12 The possibility of judicial reform follows from the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
plea bargaining is central to the criminal justice system, as evidenced by its approving quote 
of scholarly claims that plea bargaining, in fact, “is the criminal justice system.”  Frye, 132 
S. Ct. at 1407 (citing Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1912). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
14 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1041–42 (2006). 
15 287 U.S. 45, 70–71 (1932). 
16 Id. at 57. 
17 377 U.S. 201, 202–03, 206 (1964). 
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during which the defendant made incriminating statements outside the 
presence of counsel.18  Citing Powell v. Alabama, the Court noted that the 
interval between arraignment and trial was “perhaps the most critical period 
of the proceedings” and that the defendant had the right to assistance of 
counsel in investigating the charged offense and preparing for trial.19  When 
the government covertly elicited incriminating statements from an indicted 
defendant who had obtained counsel, it violated this right.20 
In United States v. Wade, the Court recognized the post-indictment 
lineup as another such “critical” stage at which the accused required 
counsel on account of the potential for police suggestivity.21  Such 
suggestivity, the Court opined, could substantially damage the accused’s 
chance of a fair trial, as an untrained citizen would be unable to detect 
suggestivity without the assistance of counsel.22 
In addition to guaranteeing defendants the right to counsel at certain 
stages of criminal proceedings, the Court made clear in Gideon v. 
Wainwright that the right to counsel applies in all criminal proceedings; the 
Court held that the right to counsel, “fundamental and essential to a fair 
trial,” applied in all courts, federal and state.23  The Court extended Gideon 
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, emphasizing the necessity of counsel in all cases 
where a guilty plea could result in imprisonment, including misdemeanor 
cases with sentences under six months.24 
B. PLEA BARGAINING AS A CRITICAL STAGE IN CRIMINAL LITIGATION 
Plea bargaining involves a trade-off between defendants and 
prosecutors, in which defendants agree to forego their constitutional right to 
a jury trial and enter a guilty plea in exchange for more lenient sentencing 
recommendations than would have been entered at trial.25  Research 
indicates that these sentencing differentials play a significant role in 
motivating the accused to plead guilty, particularly when they face the 
prospect of mandatory minimum sentences after trial.26  In turn, prosecutors 
 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 205. 
20 Id. at 206. 
21 388 U.S. 218, 223–24, 228 (1967). 
22 Id. at 230, 236–37. 
23 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
24 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). 
25 ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 44 
(2007). 
26 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 88 (2010) (noting how prosecutors stated 
that mandatory minimums were valuable, not in and of themselves, but rather as bargaining 
chips that enabled them to dispose of cases through plea agreements); see also Gifford, 
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obtain convictions, are able to promptly impose punishment, and spare the 
state the expenditure of resources involved in taking cases to trial.27  
Prosecutors have discretion to bring whatever charges they can support with 
probable cause, irrespective of whether these charges can all be proven at 
trial beyond a reasonable doubt.28  When a case is overcharged, the accused 
faces duplicate charges for single acts or crimes charged at higher degrees 
than the evidence can reasonably support.29  Without ready access to police 
reports, witnesses, and other evidence in the possession of the government, 
the accused first learns of the charges, which carry significant potential 
penalties, and any evidence the government chooses to disclose.  Even 
though Brady v. Maryland requires the prosecution to disclose any 
favorable material information to the defendant,30 the Supreme Court has 
not secured the defendant’s right to Brady material during plea bargaining.31  
Given many defendants’ inexperience in evaluating plea offers and charges 
brought against them, the need for defense counsel to provide accurate and 
noncoercive advice is imperative.32  The importance of counsel at this stage 
is evident when a plea-offer sentence is compared to a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a series of charges that may be duplicative or overcharged.  
Defense counsel is responsible for advising the client as to the value of the 
offer and the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, as well as providing 
information that will allow the client to make an informed and voluntary 
decision as to whether to ultimately accept the offer.33 
 
supra note 3, at 46.  Gifford based his conclusion on an analysis of plea bargaining practices 
in New York City, where those convicted after trial received sentences that were, on 
average, twice as long as those who entered guilty pleas.  Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 25, 
at 57; Moriarty & Main, supra note 7, at 1030.  These more recent authors call attention to 
the role that mandatory minimum sentences play in convincing the accused to forego trial. 
27 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
28 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978); see also DAVIS, supra note 
25, at 147; Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995). 
29 Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 
85–86 (1968). 
30 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
31 See generally Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The 
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3599, 3614–29 (2013) (describing the circuit splits before and after United States v. 
Ruiz as to the duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence during the plea 
bargaining process). 
32 Moriarty & Main, supra note 7, at 1045–46. 
33 Id.; see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469–70 (1969); Steven 
Zeidman, To Plead or Not To Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 852 (1998). 
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C. INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIMS RELATED TO PLEA 
BARGAINING 
Strickland v. Washington established a two-part test for habeas claims 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.34  Strickland’s two-part test 
requires (1) a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a 
showing that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.35  
Shortly after Strickland, the Supreme Court soon heard its first habeas 
petition claiming ineffective assistance in the plea-bargaining process.  In 
Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court held that the two-part test could be 
applied to habeas petitions arising out of attorney error during the plea 
process.36  The Court found that the defendant in that case was not unduly 
prejudiced by his counsel’s advice concerning his eligibility for parole.37   
The Hill majority applied Strickland’s two-part test to “challenges to guilty 
pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel,” opening the door for 
habeas relief after negotiated guilty pleas.38 
Since Hill, Strickland claims have been upheld in cases where counsel 
encouraged a defendant to plead guilty without any investigation into the 
defendant’s possible innocence or alibi,39 where an attorney failed to inform 
 
34 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
35 Id.  The Strickland Court emphasized that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential,” and that “a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance,” setting a high bar for habeas complainants to overcome.  Id. at 689.  The Padilla 
Court recognized that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), and empirical studies generally support this claim.  
Amicus briefs filed in Frye and Lafler on behalf of both the petitioners and the respondents, 
for example, cited to a study of habeas litigation in which a sample of 2,384 randomly 
selected non-capital cases that contained 768 specific claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel had only one meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., Brief 
of National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 19, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399 (2012) (Nos. 10-209 & 10-444) (citing NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 28, 52 (2007)). 
36 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
37 Id. at 60.  Justice Byron White’s concurrence suggests that counsel gave this advice based 
on misinformation the defendant had provided concerning previous convictions.  Id. at 61. 
38 Id. at 58. 
39 United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 728–29 (D. Conn. 1968).  Defense counsel 
had strongly recommended a guilty plea after discounting the credibility of potential alibi 
witnesses without attempting to contact them, and failed to qualify his recommendation by 
stating that a guilty plea was only in the defendant’s best interests if the defendant was, in 
fact, guilty.  Id. 
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a defendant of a plea offer,40 and where a conflict of interest prevented an 
attorney from negotiating a favorable deal.41 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court granted 
relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel when a defense 
attorney gave a noncitizen defendant incorrect advice about the collateral 
consequences of pleading guilty, resulting in the defendant’s deportation.42  
Padilla expanded the scope of an attorney’s duties in advising a client from 
explaining only the sentence imposed by the trial court to include other 
consequences of a guilty plea.43  Padilla has informed state court 
determinations of exactly what this duty entails.  For example, a Georgia 
court held defense attorneys responsible for their failure to inform clients 
that guilty pleas would subject them to sex offender registration 
requirements.44  An Alabama court recognized a violation of the right to 
effective counsel when counsel’s incorrect advice concerning the 
availability of credit for time served resulted in the defendant taking a plea 
that added five years to the time he believed he would serve.45  In Bauder v. 
Florida Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant 
of habeas relief after counsel mistakenly advised a defendant that he would 
not be subject to civil commitment proceedings when he pleaded no contest 
to a charge of aggravated stalking of a minor.46  These cases indicate an 
increasing awareness of the importance of correctly advising defendants 
about the collateral consequences of conviction, whether they result from a 
trial or a plea.  Professor Stephanos Bibas explains that with Padilla: 
  
 
40 Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 964, 969 (Fla. 1999) (failing to communicate a plea 
offer that could have resulted in parole or early release); People v. Whitfield, 239 N.E.2d 
850, 851 (Ill. 1968) (failing to communicate an offer to reduce charges from murder to 
manslaughter until after bench trial conviction); Ross, supra note 7, at 721 (citing Cottle).  
41 Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748, 749 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Ross, supra note 7, at 
721 (discussing counsel’s attempt to work out a plea agreement in which one of his clients 
would testify against the other). 
42 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).  Padilla, a permanent U.S resident, pleaded guilty to 
three drug-related charges in exchange for a ten-year sentence and was advised not to worry 
about immigration-related consequences, even though he pleaded guilty to deportable 
offenses.  Id. 
43 See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOWARD L.J. 675, 675–76 (2011). 
44 Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing how an 
individual eventually won ineffective counsel relief after he was not advised that he would 
be required to register as a sex offender when he pleaded guilty to two counts of child 
molestation and only learned of this when he met his probation officer two years later). 
45 Stith v. State, 76 So. 3d 286, 293 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). 
46 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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[T]he Court began to move beyond its fixation upon the handful of cases that go to 
jury trials.  It recognized that the other 95 percent of adjudicated cases resolved by 
guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest to regulate plea bargains the way it 
has long regulated jury trials.47 
D. REMEDYING INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING CASES 
Up until the decisions in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the 
circuit courts split over the question of whether plea bargaining was a 
critical stage, as well as the appropriate remedy for successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims based on deficient plea-bargaining 
performances.  For instance, in Williams v. Jones, the Tenth Circuit held 
that plea bargaining was a critical stage and that counsel was ineffective 
when he dissuaded a defendant from accepting a plea offer when the 
defendant was willing to accept a ten-year sentence for second-degree 
murder.48  Williams’s attorney believed Williams was innocent and 
threatened to withdraw if he accepted the offer, which would have left 
Williams without counsel.49  At trial, the jury found Williams guilty of first-
degree murder, and the court sentenced him to life without parole.50  On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and held that even though Williams received a fair trial, deficient 
counsel substantially prejudiced him.51  The Tenth Circuit declined to 
decide whether to reinstate the plea offer or to offer Williams a new trial 
and instructed the district court to exercise discretion on remand.52 
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Springs held that 
subpar assistance in plea bargaining could not establish prejudice under 
Strickland and that a defendant was entitled to a fair trial under the law, but 
not to a discounted sentence secured through plea bargaining.53  Thus, as of 
2011, defendants could receive three possible remedies when courts granted 
their habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
plea-bargaining process: no remedy, specific performance of the offered 
 
47 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011). 
48 571 F.3d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1091. 
52 Id. at 1094.  On remand, the district court granted the habeas petition and released 
Williams from custody, giving him credit for time served while leaving the first-degree 
murder conviction intact.  Williams v. Jones, No. CIV 03-201-RAW-KEW, 2010 WL 
3834584, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 
WL 3834580, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010). 
53 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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plea bargain, and retrial.54 
In 2011, Lafler and Frye came before the Supreme Court, raising 
additional issues about ineffectiveness claims with respect to plea 
bargaining.  The Court’s holdings in these cases make clear that prejudice 
arising from counsel’s deficient performance extends beyond acceptance of 
a guilty plea based on misinformation concerning the consequences of a 
plea.55  As Frye indicates, prejudice can exist when a defense attorney fails 
to communicate a favorable plea offer to a client who later pleads guilty to a 
more serious offense.56  Alternatively, as Lafler indicates, prejudice can 
arise when counsel’s erroneous beliefs about the State’s ability to establish 
elements of a crime results in rejecting a plea in favor of a trial, after which 
a convicted defendant receives a harsher sentence than the rejected plea 
offer, even if the trial was free of constitutional error.57  In Frye, the 
Supreme Court took upon itself the challenge of determining the duties of 
defense counsel,58 and in Lafler the Court prescribed appropriate remedies 
when counsel fails to perform said duties in the course of plea 
negotiations.59  The following Sections address each case in turn. 
E. LAFLER V. COOPER 
After shooting a woman in the hip, abdomen, and buttock, Anthony 
Cooper was charged with assault with intent to murder, along with three 
other charges.60  The prosecution offered to dismiss two of the charges, 
recommending a fifty-one- to eighty-five-month sentence in exchange for a 
guilty plea.61  Cooper, who had been charged as a habitual offender, 
admitted guilt and expressed his willingness to accept the plea.62  Counsel 
dissuaded him from doing so, believing that the government could not 
establish intent to murder.63  The case went to trial, and Cooper was 
convicted and sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 months’ 
 
54 David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1535 (2011). 
55 See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52 (1985). 
56 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012).  In Frye’s case, prosecutors offered to 
reduce a felony charge to a misdemeanor.  Id. at 1404. 
57 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012). 
58 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
59 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391. 
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imprisonment.64 
The state court denied Cooper’s appeal, but the district court granted a 
writ for habeas corpus relief, which the Sixth Circuit later affirmed.65  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.66 
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy held that when ineffective 
assistance results in a rejected plea offer and conviction at trial, the 
appropriate remedy is not the fair trial that the defendant subsequently 
received, but instead, a hearing to determine whether the defendant would 
have accepted the plea if not for ineffective counsel.67  After such a hearing, 
the trial court’s options include resentencing based on the conviction at trial 
or reopening the plea offer, depending on the circumstances of the case.68  
Rather than the district court’s chosen remedy of specific performance, the 
Court ordered the State to reoffer the plea, leaving the questions of 
appropriate sentencing and convictions to the trial court.69  The Court noted 
that sentences after trial tend to be more severe than those pursuant to plea 
bargains, as was the case in Lafler.70  Unlike instances where a subsequent 
fair trial cured any defects resulting from defective performance of defense 
counsel, the injury to the defendant resulted from taking the case to trial.71 
During oral argument, the Justices disagreed as to the nature of the 
prejudice that Cooper suffered as a result of his attorney’s deficient 
performance.72  In support of his prejudice claim, Cooper argued that his 
sentence was three times as long as the sentence that he would have 
received had he entered the offered guilty plea.73  He did receive a trial by 
jury after invoking his constitutional right to a trial, however, and the trial 
itself was not tainted by constitutional error.74 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, revived this point and 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1383–84. 
66 Id. at 1384, 1376. 
67 Id. at 1389 (“In this situation [when charges that would have been admitted as part of a 
plea bargain are the same charges the defendant is convicted of at trial] the court may 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel’s errors he would have accepted the plea.”). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1391. 
70 Id. at 1387 (“The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of 
cases.  It is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view 
full price as the norm and anything less a bargain.” (quoting Bibas, supra note 47, at 1138)). 
71 Id. at 1386. 
72 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 22, 23, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 10-209). 
73 Id. at 7–8. 
74 Id. at 13–14. 
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criticized the majority for bringing plea-bargaining law under the banner of 
criminal procedure, thereby extending constitutional protections beyond the 
scope of the Sixth Amendment and “elevat[ing] plea bargaining from a 
necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”75  In keeping with his 
commitment to originalism, Justice Scalia emphasized the trial by jury as 
the “gold standard of American justice.”76  Justice Scalia suggested that the 
majority’s holding would open a new realm of constitutional law.77  This 
new “boutique of constitutional jurisprudence” would, in turn, result in 
further constitutional litigation, including litigation about the 
constitutionality of prosecutorial decisions.78 
However, the majority’s position was much closer to Justice Elena 
Kagan’s position during oral argument.  Justice Kagan pointed out that the 
Court has recognized plea bargaining as a critical stage “because about 98 
percent of the action of the criminal justice system occurs in plea 
bargaining.”79  Thus, depriving a defendant of effective assistance of 
counsel at that stage, where the vast majority of the action takes place, 
would be incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.80 
F. MISSOURI V. FRYE 
On the same day that it issued Lafler, the Supreme Court also ruled on 
Missouri v. Frye, another plea-bargaining case.  Galin Frye was charged 
with driving with a revoked license.  He had been convicted of the same 
crime three times before.81  On account of these previous convictions, 
Frye’s charge amounted to a Class D felony, with a maximum penalty of 
four years in prison.82  Prosecutors presented two offers to Frye’s attorney.  
The first offer involved a guilty plea to the felony charge and a 
recommended sentence of three years, while the second offer reduced the 
charge to a misdemeanor and recommended a ninety-day sentence.83  Frye’s 
attorney communicated neither offer to him, and Frye was again arrested for 
driving with a suspended license before his preliminary hearing, two days 
 
75 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 1398. 
77 Id.; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Adding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral 
consequences has no logical stopping point.”). 
78 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392. 
79 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 72, at 25. 
80 Id. 
81 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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after the offers expired.84  Frye later pleaded guilty, without any agreement, 
and was sentenced to three years in prison.85  In his appeal for 
postconviction relief, Frye alleged that his attorney’s failure to inform him 
of the misdemeanor plea offer, which he would have accepted, amounted to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.86  Frye’s claim, denied in state court, was 
reversed on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
an appropriate remedy.87 
Again writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that, “as a 
general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers 
from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be 
favorable to the accused.”88  Such terms and conditions “may result in a 
lesser sentence, a conviction on lesser charges, or both.”89  Frye’s counsel’s 
failure to do so fell below Strickland’s objective standard and caused 
substantial prejudice to the defendant, who showed a reasonable probability 
that he would have accepted the offer on the basis of his guilty plea to the 
felony charge.90  The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the 
Missouri Court of Appeals to determine whether the prosecution would 
have adhered to the offer, with resentencing to possibly follow.91  In Frye, 
as in Lafler, the Court recognized that without extending Sixth Amendment 
protection to the plea-bargaining process, “[c]riminal procedure thus 
becomes a binary on/off switch, fully enforced at jury trials but simply 
inapplicable in plea bargaining.”92 
Again, Justice Scalia dissented, making the point that although Lafler’s 
conviction resulted from a jury trial, Frye’s conviction was based on his 
plea and the admission of guilt that accompanied it.93  Justice Scalia again 
raised concerns about applying Sixth Amendment protections to the plea-
bargaining process.  While the ineffectiveness in Frye’s case was clear, he 
commented, it would not be so clear in other cases, especially given that 
negotiation is often a matter of an attorney’s personal style.94  In addition, 
Justice Samuel Alito raised the concern that the sort of prejudice resulting 
in Frye, where failure to communicate a misdemeanor plea offer resulted in 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1405. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1408. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1410–11. 
91 Id. 
92 Bibas, supra note 47, at 1122. 
93 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 
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a guilty plea to a felony, would always exist when defendants rejected 
favorable deals and judges imposed much harsher sentences after trial.95  If 
prejudice would not be difficult to show, something more than a reasonable 
probability would be required to maintain Strickland’s high bar.96 
II. DISCUSSION 
The dissents in Frye and Lafler raised the question as to whether these 
cases opened the door for a slew of new habeas petitions, filed by 
defendants who argue that they would have accepted favorable plea offers 
had their attorneys not persuaded them to take their cases to trial.  While 
insufficient time has elapsed to provide the requisite empirical data to 
determine whether such a result has materialized, the Court confronted a 
similar question in Padilla; it determined that lower courts had not been 
overburdened by habeas filings from defendants who pleaded guilty since 
Hill endorsed such petitions.97  The Court in Padilla noted that as of 2003, 
pleas accounted for 95% of all convictions98 and 30% of all habeas 
petitions, with the other 70% of habeas petitions filed by those 5% of 
defendants who took their cases to trial and were convicted.99  Nonetheless, 
Justice Scalia’s Lafler dissent raised a more significant concern.  Justice 
Scalia noted that the Lafler and Frye majorities only touched upon two 
possible forms of counsels’ incompetence in plea bargaining and warned 
that additional litigation would follow, potentially encompassing the 
constitutionality of prosecutorial practices.100 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to date has provided remedies intended 
to safeguard the rights of the criminal defendant who has been prejudiced 
by ineffective counsel, indirectly regulating defense attorneys’ practices.101 
 
95 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (No. 10-444). 
96 Id. at 40. 
97 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct 1473, 1485 (2010). 
98 Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450 tbl.5.46 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen 
Maguire eds., 2005) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS]). 
99 Id. (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO ET AL., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
36–38 (1994)).  The Court noted that Flango demonstrated how “5% of defendants whose 
conviction was the result of a trial account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions 
filed.”  Id. at 1485 n.14. 
100 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For arguments 
supporting Justice Scalia’s claim, see, for example, Aaron K. Friess, Note, Soothsaying With 
a Foggy Crystal Ball: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Remedy for Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel When a Criminal Defendant Rejects a Plea Bargain, 52 WASHBURN 
L.J. 147, 168–69 n.173–74 (2012). 
101 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391; 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).  Similarly, plea-
bargaining literature focuses on the role of defense attorneys in the bargaining process.  See 
2014] CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE 471 
In its review of guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has focused attention 
on the information available to defendants so as to ensure that enough was 
present for them to knowingly and voluntarily waive their procedural 
rights.102  Competent defense counsel has been the one substantial safeguard 
that has undergirded the Court’s decisionmaking, and plea-bargaining 
jurisprudence has focused on ensuring that defense attorneys provide advice 
that meets this standard.103  However, if Justice Scalia’s prediction is 
credible, the Court is likely to broaden its scope of inquiry in plea-
bargaining cases.  One reason comes from the systemic impediments to 
effective counsel, which reinforce plea bargaining as a standard practice, 
while shifting negotiations from a defendant’s guilt or innocence to the 
most acceptable sentence for disposing his case. 
A. CASELOADS AS A SYSTEMIC IMPEDIMENT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
Both prosecutors and public defenders currently face caseloads far 
beyond any attorney’s ability to competently manage.104  The National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals set a 
guideline of no more than 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile 
cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals in a year.105  However, public 
defender caseloads rarely abide by these guidelines.106  Few offices have 
“enforceable, maximum caseload standards,” and those that do often exceed 
them.107 
The Knox County Public Defender’s Community Law Office in 
Tennessee, for instance, recently sought judicial relief by having a court 
suspend its appointment to cases in misdemeanor court, when four attorneys 
were responsible for 3,500 cases in a year.108  As the Public Defender 
testified, initial thirty-minute interviews with clients alone consumed an 
 
generally Albert Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.  
1179 (1975); Moriarty & Main, supra note 7. 
102 See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 
622, 629–30 (2002); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 626 (1998); Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466–67 (1969). 
103 Bibas, supra note 47, at 1126. 
104 See Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor 
Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 538 (2012). 
105 AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN 
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002). 
106 See NORMAN LEFSTEIN & ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 65–70 (2009). 
107 Id. at 67. 
108 Transcript of Proceedings at 5, 21, In re Petition of Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender (June 
10, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/EE2MKB. 
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entire week of their attorneys’ time, leaving no time to investigate, contact 
officers, or interview witnesses in advance of trials.109  Even with attorneys 
arriving at the office early, working weekends and holidays, and not taking 
their annual leave, these caseloads were compromising their abilities to 
provide effective representation.110  Felony attorneys also took on 
misdemeanor cases, with one public defender stating through an affidavit 
that she represented clients in approximately 297 cases, including 101 
felonies, 186 misdemeanors, and 10 probation violations.111  Eight months 
after the hearing, the Tennessee General Sessions Court denied relief, 
finding that while such caseloads “exceed[ed] national criminal justice 
standards and goals,” they were not at “such a level as to violate the right to 
competent counsel under either the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of Tennessee.”112 
Knox County’s public defenders are not alone.  Public defenders in 
Minnesota averaged 900 cases a year in 2003,113 and the two attorneys 
assigned to the juvenile division in Clark County, Nevada, had caseloads of 
nearly 1,500 clients.114  When public defenders in a Louisiana parish, with 
caseloads of 472 clients apiece, began refusing to take on new clients on 
account of their existing caseloads, a judge turned to the phone book, 
calling attorneys and appointing them as counsel for indigent defendants.115  
Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright,116 which guaranteed the right to 
counsel,117 an American Bar Association (ABA) report recognized the 
widespread inadequacy of representation for indigent defendants, and 
among other measures, recommended that indigent defense programs cease 
taking new cases when their attorneys’ caseloads precluded them from 
providing quality representation.118  Minnesota’s chief public defender went 
so far as to file suit in state court, arguing that the systems in place deprived 
clients of effective assistance of counsel by underfunding public defense 
 
109 Id. at 28–29. 
110 Id. at 31–32, 44. 
111 NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 170 
(2011). 
112 Id. at 171 (citation omitted). 
113 Backus & Marcus, supra note 14, at 1055–56. 
114 Id. at 1055. 
115 Id. 
116 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
117 Id. at 344. 
118 AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], available at http://goo.gl/tsjHAO. 
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systems and failing to enforce recommended caseload limits.119  This and 
other similar suits filed by public defenders in state courts have been largely 
unsuccessful to date, however, with federal courts either denying or 
declining to hear them on appeal.120  While litigation has yet to successfully 
limit the caseloads of defense counsel for the indigent, these lawsuits have 
raised awareness through media coverage, and some offices have been able 
to present empirical data concerning their needs when arguing for increased 
funding.121 
Like public defenders, prosecutors are just as overburdened by their 
caseloads.  For instance, junior prosecutors in Houston have approximately 
500 open cases at any time during a year, during which time each attorney 
is responsible for handling 1,500.122  The average felony prosecutor in 
Chicago handles fewer cases than do these prosecutors, but her caseload 
still amounts to 300 open cases at once and 800 to 1,000 cases per year.123  
While Las Vegas had 90 prosecutors in 2009, each prosecutor was still 
responsible for nearly 800 cases.124  If prosecutorial caseloads were 
measured by standards similar to those recommended for public defenders, 
many prosecutors would well exceed those standards.125 
 
119 Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996). 
120 See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 427, 440, 470–71 (2009).  The Florida Supreme Court recently held 
that the Miami-Dade County Public Defender could move to withdraw from cases en masse.  
Pub. Defender v. Florida, 115 So.3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013).  The Public Defender had 
implemented a number of measures to reduce excessive caseloads, but an office-wide 
problem remained as to effective representation.  Id.  The Florida Supreme Court then 
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether such circumstances still existed 
five years after the trial court’s initial ruling.  Id. at 279. 
121 Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 11, at 277; see also LEFSTEIN & SPANGENBERG, 
supra note 106, at 67.  The Spangenberg Group has conducted several studies of state and 
county defense systems with the goal of providing recommendations to ensure effective 
defense of the indigent.  See Indigent Defense Studies, SPANGENBERG GRP., 
http://goo.gl/9BrQiP (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).  When Minnesota created a state board to 
oversee and fund its public defender system, the state legislature commissioned a 
Spangenberg study to analyze caseloads and make recommendations.  Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d 
at 4.  When the Louisiana Supreme Court created a committee  to study the state’s indigent 
defense system and make recommendations, it commissioned a Spangenberg report.  See 
State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 789 n.8 (1993). 
122 Rapping, supra note 104, at 538–39. 
123 Id. at 539. 
124 Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 11, at 272; Rapping, supra note 104, at 539. 
125 Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 11, at 266–67.  In response to Gershowitz and 
Killinger’s research, Josh Bowers challenges the empirical data they rely upon and questions 
the propriety of applying an identical caseload benchmark to both public defenders and 
prosecutors.  Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, A Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 145 (2011).  With those caveats in mind, Bowers notes 
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Overburdened prosecutors, relying heavily upon plea bargaining, may 
benefit defendants, who are offered more favorable sentences than might be 
awarded at trial.126  However, this arguable benefit is accompanied by a 
number of harmful effects on defendants, victims, and the public at large.  
The public can be particularly impacted when the factually guilty receive 
excessive lenience because of prosecutors’ excessive caseloads.127  In 
particular, when prosecutors lack the time and resources to properly 
investigate cases and interview witnesses, their sentencing 
recommendations could be based on preliminary scans of the police reports 
and the criminal records of the accused, without consideration of potentially 
exculpatory evidence, defenses, and mitigating factors.  Plea offers attached 
to deadlines that preclude investigation are transparent in their purpose to 
alleviate attorneys’ caseloads, rather than address the specific facts of a 
particular charged offense. 
In their study on the impact of excessive prosecutorial caseloads, 
Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger recommend increased funding for 
both prosecutors and attorneys for indigent defendants128 (whose chronic 
underfunding is well-documented).129  Allocating additional funds that 
provide sufficient time and resources for investigation would allow 
prosecutors to make clearer distinctions within the defendant pool and to 
make offers on this basis, which would address some of the specific effects 
of excessive caseloads mentioned above.  While additional financial 
resources could aid in resolving some of the problems associated with 
caseload management, simply increasing the resources available to 
prosecutors and defense attorneys does not address the asymmetry of the 
plea-bargaining process.  This asymmetry follows from the additional tools 
that prosecutors have to handle their caseload; specifically, prosecutorial 
discretion allows the State to pursue or dismiss charges, irrespective of the 
defense’s posture.  For this reason, further litigation focused on reviewing 
 
that the counties mentioned above, as well as those encompassing Miami, Dallas, and Fort 
Lauderdale, exceed the suggested measure of excessiveness, which allows for the inference 
that Gerschowitz and Killinger “have identified a genuine problem that, at a minimum, 
affects hundreds of thousands of criminal cases each year.”  Id. 
126 Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 11, at 279–80. 
127 Id. at 295. 
128 Id. at 265. 
129 See generally, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 118; Backus & Marcus, 
supra note 14; Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of 
Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 783; Drinan, supra note 120; Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded 
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377–94 
(1995); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734–35 (2005). 
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prosecutorial practices will be a necessary complement to legislative 
reforms geared at providing additional financial resources to attorneys in 
the criminal legal system. 
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE FORCES THAT SUBVERT IT 
Some scholars have argued that plea bargaining is best explained by a 
contractual metaphor insofar as it involves a bargained-for exchange with 
both parties trading risk for something of value.130  However, because 
prosecutors have both significant duties to the public and the ability to 
exercise wide-ranging discretion, the metaphor cannot hold, for the plea 
agreements are not at all like the bilateral agreements between two parties 
negotiating a business deal.131  Namely, the defendant faces a potential loss 
of liberty, while the government has a responsibility to victims and to the 
public that is very different from a private attorney’s duty to corporate 
clients and, by proxy, their shareholders.132  As agents of the U.S. 
government, prosecutors have a duty not to earn a profit for their clients but 
instead to ensure that justice be done and “that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer.”133  In achieving this goal, the prosecutor “may strike hard 
blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”134  The 
seminal case Brady v. Maryland also calls attention to the importance of 
prosecutors ensuring due process, stating that “[s]ociety wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”135  
Brady even cites an inscription within the Department of Justice that reads, 
“‘The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in 
the courts.’”136  In the context of plea bargaining, Brady can be considered 
an obligation to do justice by disclosing information favorable to the 
defense prior to presenting a plea offer, which would help the accused 
 
130 See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (evaluating arguments against plea bargaining through the lenses of 
classical contract and bargain theory, and arguing that contract reasoning is better suited than 
constitutional analysis for solving problems associated with plea bargaining). 
131 See Bibas, supra note 47, at 1159; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1985. 
132 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 
2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1997); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1987–91. 
133 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
134 Id. 
135 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). 
136 Id. 
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evaluate the proposed offer.137  Such a scenario is not as far-fetched as it 
might sound, for the Supreme Court has recognized that Brady “represents 
a limited departure from a pure adversary model” by “requiring the 
prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case.”138 
1. External Institutional Pressures 
However, these ideals about justice can be subverted by systemic 
pressures and by external forces that have left prosecutors with both more 
cases than they can effectively handle and an expanded set of tools for 
obtaining convictions.  For instance, from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
politicians from both parties made promises to be tough on crime, with 
media portrayals propelling crime to the top of the domestic agenda in the 
1980s and 1990s.139 
The 1980s and 1990s were marked by what scholars have termed 
overcriminalization, which created an additional class of criminal offenses 
with significant consequences for the accused.140  In the wake of the so-
called War on Drugs, a more punitive criminal justice system emerged, as 
evidenced by life sentences for recidivism and mandatory minimum 
sentences that eliminated judicial discretion and transferred it to 
prosecutors.141  The oft-criticized Federal Sentencing Guidelines were also 
issued in this era.142 
The resulting dilemma facing prosecutors in this context could be 
summarized as follows: 
The prosecutor in this new era thus has a difficult choice: to refuse to prosecute more 
cases than the system can handle justly in the face of pressure to do otherwise or to 
bring cases without regard for resources in order to satisfy society’s increasingly 
punitive appetite, regardless of the fact that it will jeopardize the protections that 
define justice.143 
This is a particularly significant challenge for those prosecutors who seek 
reelection or aspire to higher offices within the political system and do not 
 
137 See Petegorsky, supra note 30, at 3641. 
138 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985). 
139 ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 45–56. 
140 See generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
703 (2005) (describing overcriminalization and offering an account of its growth, causes, 
and costs before proposing a libertarian response that might have been added to then-
pending legislation); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012) (noting the rapid growth of the federal criminal code since 1970). 
141 ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 48–56, 86; see also Luna, supra note 140. 
142 DAVIS, supra note 25, at 103. 
143 Rapping, supra note 104, at 537. 
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want to be perceived or portrayed as soft on crime.144 
2. Institutional Pressures 
In addition to these external pressures, prosecutors also face internal 
institutional pressures related to the organizational culture of their offices.  
Ronald Wright and Kay Levine point to the ways in which the “unwritten 
social rules, norms and language” of a prosecutorial office, communicated 
informally to newer attorneys, “do more than simply define how a 
prosecutor acts; they define who a prosecutor is.”145 
Also within the prosecutorial context, John Rapping identifies four 
values that contribute to an organizational culture that breeds injustice, 
compromises the ethical obligations of even the most well-intentioned 
prosecutors and leads them to use the tools at their disposal to force plea 
bargains.146  These four values are: (1) prioritizing convictions, (2) 
dehumanizing the accused, (3) disregarding procedural protections that 
stand in the way of securing convictions, and (4) viewing defense attorneys 
as obstacles to justice.147  When incentives for prosecuting attorneys’ career 
advancement are tied to conviction rates and the vast majority of 
convictions come from pleas, prosecutors’ reasons for tailoring plea offers 
to generate convictions become more readily understood.148 
It is within these contexts that one can understand how practices of 
overcharging and extending exploding offers have developed, as they have 
become effective ways for prosecutors to meet both internal and external 
expectations and more effectively manage their caseloads.149  The plea offer 
has become a powerful means to effectively transfer discretion to defense 
attorneys, who have significant immediate incentives for convincing 
indigent clients to waive their Sixth Amendment rights and truncate due 
process.150  Private defense attorneys who receive flat fees or set hourly 
rates have an incentive to spend as little time as possible on a given case, 
while public defenders have a limited amount of time to divide among their 
 
144 See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is 
How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for 
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147 Id. at 559. 
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many clients.151  The following Section addresses overcharging in greater 
detail. 
C. OVERCHARGING AND COERCIVE PLEA BARGAINING 
Overcharging, one practice that prosecutors can employ, takes two 
primary forms.  Vertical overcharging involves charging defendants with a 
stronger variation of a form of conduct, along with a lesser version, for the 
same offense.152  For instance, prosecutors can charge felonies in both the 
first and the second degree, or pair felony and misdemeanor charges.  As 
long as both counts can be supported by the equivalent of probable cause, 
which occasioned the arrest, multiple counts can stand until trial, 
encompassing the bulk of the plea-bargaining process.  Multiple counts thus 
impact plea bargaining by encouraging defendants “to plead guilty to a 
lesser offense—often to the charge that absent strategic considerations 
would have been selected initially—simply to avoid risking conviction on 
the higher charge.”153 
The second practice, horizontal charging, involves charging defendants 
with multiple distinct crimes resulting from the same conduct.154  For 
instance, a prosecutor can charge “street terrorism” alongside robbery, or 
charge simple battery alongside disorderly conduct.155  Overbroad criminal 
statutes also make it possible to charge one act as multiple counts.  Thus, a 
prosecutor may charge a defendant with eight criminal counts for one action 
and present the defendant with a plea offer that appears generous when the 
defendant compares it to a maximum sentence that incorporates punishment 
for all eight counts, which thereby exploits informational asymmetries in 
the bargaining process.156  Tacking on additional counts provides 
prosecutors with leverage in the plea-bargaining process and also affords a 
backup at trial if the jury opts to acquit on the main charge.157  While the 
ABA standard for prosecution is not to press charges that cannot be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct requires that every charge be supported by probable cause, no 
 
151 Id. at 239–41. 
152 Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 
86 (1968). 
153 Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1255 (2008); see also Gutiérrez, supra note 3, at 717 
(quoting Covey, supra). 
154 Alschuler, supra note 152, at 85. 
155 H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the 
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 85 (2011). 
156 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 130, at 1964. 
157 DAVIS, supra note 25, at 31. 
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external check generally prevents prosecutors from charging offenses at a 
disproportionately high level with respect to the conduct at issue.158  While 
prosecutorial discretion as to what charges to file does provide law 
enforcement personnel with additional time to investigate, it also allows 
prosecutors to begin the plea-negotiating process from a stronger position 
than they would do otherwise.159 
Although ethical codes discourage prosecutors from overcharging, it is 
unclear how the existence of the codes affects prosecutorial discretion 
without additional checks, such as internal review boards and external 
audits of charging decisions, apart from those that take place in grand jury 
proceedings.160  Overcharging sets parameters for negotiation that favor the 
prosecution, giving the prosecution the additional leverage to threaten 
harsher sentences than the offenses warrant at trial.  The grand jury, 
intended to be a “protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive 
government action,” also strongly favors the prosecution.161  The Supreme 
Court has held that there is no requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence 
to grand juries, while state courts are split on the question.162  In addition, a 
suspect called before the grand jury for questioning cannot insist that 
counsel be present in the grand jury room.163  With defense counsel absent 
from the proceedings, the prosecution controls the information presented to 
the grand jury and may obtain indictments on the basis of hearsay evidence 
that will be inadmissible at trial.164 
Within these parameters, prosecutors have ample incentive to 
overcharge when trial would be inefficient and when they believe the 
defendants are guilty of one of the charged offenses.165  Prosecutors can 
obtain leverage by overcharging, which opens the door for coercive 
 
158 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2012) (requiring a prosecutor to 
“refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause”).  This is a minimal standard that permits an individual prosecutor to file charges 
when she has enough evidence (such as an arrest) to form a subjective belief about the 
accused’s guilt.  See Meares, supra note 28, at 864; Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally 
Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2187, 2188–89 (2010). 
159 See Meares, supra note 28, at 866. 
160 Medwed, supra note 158, at 2188–90. 
161 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). 
162 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).  For a review of the states that 
give prosecutors broad, limited, or no duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries, 
see generally Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Duty of Prosecutor to Present Exculpatory 
Evidence to State Grand Jury, 49 A.L.R. 639 (1997) (analyzing and categorizing state cases 
directly addressing the prosecutor’s duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury). 
163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). 
164 See generally Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
165 Caldwell, supra note 155, at 72; see Meares, supra note 28, at 863–67. 
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pleas.166  Threats of additional charges based on habitual offender laws 
weaken defense counsels’ negotiating position,167 particularly when these 
charges carry mandatory minimum sentences that minimize judicial 
discretion in sentencing.  In such circumstances, even defendants with 
counsel are more likely to accept guilty pleas, in light of the risks of 
conviction at trial and the resultant sentencing penalties.168 
D. DEFENSE RESPONSES TO THE EVOLVING PLEA MARKET 
Professor Stephanos Bibas alludes to the role that charging decisions 
and information asymmetries play in setting the parameters of plea 
negotiations, as well as to the defendants’ need for information in 
evaluating plea offers.169  The Frye and Lafler opinions echo Bibas’s 
statement: 
Plea bargaining is thus not an esoteric corner of the market reserved for indisputably 
guilty defendants who should be happy to receive any lower sentences as a matter of 
grace.  It is the market, and defendants need competent advice about the facets and 
consequences of the transaction before they agree to a deal.170 
In a separate piece, Bibas explains the fallacies of considering trials to 
be the norm and of basing sentencing assessments upon this mistaken 
assumption.171  A charging standard of probable cause, overbroad and 
overlapping criminal statutes, and mandatory minimum sentences work in 
combination to inflate the potential sentence so much that the baseline 
sentence after a plea appears to be a discount.172  In this situation, “[w]hen 
prosecutors threaten inflated post-trial sentences to induce pleas, defendants 
are less free to test their guilt at trial.  Defendants may be better off if they 
play the game well but much worse off if they do not.”173 
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining, the presence of overcharging, 
and the sentence penalties incurred after trial, it can plausibly be argued 
that, to provide effective assistance, defense attorneys must be familiar with 
a given prosecutorial office’s charging patterns and be able to discern the 
distinctions between the sticker price and the going rate.174  Effective 
 
166 Caldwell, supra note 155, at 84. 
167 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–60 (1978). 
168 DAVIS, supra note 25, at 56–57; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea 
Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 653 (1981). 
169 Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 79, 80 (2011). 
170 Id. at 83. 
171 See Bibas, supra note 47, at 1127–28. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1128. 
174 Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 
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advocates will not just prevent convictions of the innocent, but they will 
also mitigate punitive damages imposed against the guilty through charge 
enhancement and sentencing.175 
In addition to becoming attuned to the plea-deal market, defense 
counsel must fulfill their baseline responsibilities of assessing the facts of 
cases, clients’ individualized life circumstances, and the likelihood of 
convictions at trial to provide the accused with enough information to make 
informed decisions about the offered pleas.  While the sheer volume of 
cases that attorneys for indigent defendants handle weighs against their 
ability to provide effective counsel, the problem is compounded by another 
tool at prosecutors’ disposal: exploding offers.  Exploding offers combine 
guilty pleas to lesser charges with narrow windows of time before the offers 
expire.  Those windows can be as short as the several hours between the 
beginning and end of an arraignment calendar.176  These offers put defense 
attorneys, who have a minimal amount of time to investigate cases, in the 
position of preparing Strickland claims against themselves while advising 
defendants on the merits of the pleas.177  Even in misdemeanor cases, this 
practice pervades.178  As Margaret Colgate Love, liaison to the ABA 
Standards Committee from the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Organization, comments: 
The facts of life in busy misdemeanor courts make a mockery of the current ABA 
Standard warning that defense counsel should “under no circumstances . . . 
recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and 
study of the case has been completed.”  At the same time, the severity of the penalties 
to which even misdemeanants are now exposed lends constitutional force to policy 
arguments that clients charged with minor crimes should not be compelled to plead as 
a condition of release.  If “prevailing professional norms” forbid a lawyer to advise a 
client to plead at first appearance before adequate investigation and counseling can 
take place, any such plea would be entered in the absence of genuine defense 
representation, and would thus be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.  It is safe to 
predict that an insistence on a genuine opportunity for counseling in light of the 
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175 Bibas, supra note 47, at 1141. 
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severity of potential collateral consequences will result either in fewer pleas or, in 
time, fewer consequences.179 
Courts have long recognized that criminal defendants face pressure to 
plead guilty even when they are innocent and have focused their attention 
on preventing prosecutors from both overtly coercing defendants into 
making pleas and convicting the factually innocent.180  At the federal level, 
courts have taken initial steps to minimize the dangers of coercing guilty 
pleas from innocent defendants by requiring judicial determinations that the 
pleas rest upon factual bases.181  Overcharging has primarily been evaluated 
within the academy, however, and not in the court system.  A number of 
potential solutions have been suggested and are summarized below.182 
E. POTENTIAL PLEA-BARGAINING REFORMS 
In light of the structural imbalances within the criminal legal system 
and the prevalence of plea bargaining, a number of scholars have presented 
proposals to reform the process.  At one end of the spectrum, scholars have 
called for the abolition of plea bargaining, which is not permitted in Japan 
and is not relied upon in much of continental Europe.183  Such a radical 
change does not appear likely to happen any time soon.184  Less radical 
reform proposals call for changing the structure of the plea bargaining 
system and encouraging sentence bargaining, where bargaining is reserved 
for the sentence, not the charge.185  Professor Oren Gazal-Ayal has 
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proposed a partial ban on plea bargaining.186  In a system with such a ban, 
judges could identify weaker cases because of the significant concessions 
prosecutors offered in exchange for guilty pleas and could prohibit plea 
bargains in those cases.187  This would effectively force the state to drop 
charges and allocate its trial resources to stronger cases.188 
Bibas attempts to minimize information asymmetry by insisting on 
open discovery during plea negotiations so that defense counsel can better 
evaluate the government’s case and recognize overcharging.189  Pleas would 
still predominate, but defense counsel would begin in relatively stronger 
positions to negotiate and could more effectively advise their clients earlier 
in the process.  Furthermore, the government’s interest in securing pleas 
from factually guilty defendants would not be compromised if prosecutors 
had to disclose exculpatory evidence earlier in the process.190  However, as 
mentioned above, issues of funding and workload would need to be 
addressed so as to ensure that prosecutors actually review such evidence 
and that inadvertent Brady violations, in which prosecutors withhold 
potentially exculpatory evidence, would not occur.191 
In contrast to Bibas’s proposal to open discovery and rely upon 
defense counsel’s instincts to recognize overcharged cases, Professor 
Daniel Medwed suggests that a higher charging standard would force 
prosecutors to charge cases accordingly.192  Such a change would need to be 
accompanied by a mechanism for oversight, like an internal charging 
review board that would encourage critical reflection about the cases.193  
Medwed recognizes the practical problems with establishing such an 
oversight team, given the proliferation of cases that many prosecutorial 
offices face.194  He suggests that the board would not review all cases but 
would focus upon those with the most significant risks of wrongful 
convictions.195  Common characteristics associated with wrongful 
 
186 See generally Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6 (arguing that the prevalence of plea 
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484 MIKE WORK [Vol. 104 
convictions include “eyewitness misidentifications, false confessions, 
jailhouse informants, police and prosecutorial misconduct, use of dubious 
forensic science, and ineffective assistance of defense counsel.”196  While 
Medwed’s concern is with wrongfully convicting the innocent, scholars 
who have raised questions about coercive pleas in general echo his cry for 
prosecutorial oversight.197  Such oversight could take the form of an 
oversight body reviewing notations in prosecutors’ files made when they 
dropped original charges after accepting pleas, requiring written plea offers 
subject to supervisory review and approval, employing internal regulation 
through multiple-source feedback loops that control the reward and 
promotion systems, or using systematic audits from internal oversight 
teams.198  As H. Mitchell Caldwell observes, these approaches all raise 
questions about how they could induce voluntary compliance, absent 
increased funding and some form of external oversight, which Caldwell 
supports.199 
Each of these reform schemes has its merits, and a comprehensive 
approach that brings together their collective strengths would begin to 
address overcharging.  Without judicial prompting and an effective means 
of ensuring compliance, however, it is unlikely that any substantial reforms 
to the plea process will be implemented. 
By examining the plea-bargaining process in both Frye and Lafler and 
bringing it under the critical stage doctrine, the Supreme Court has cleared a 
pathway for courts to evaluate practices associated with plea bargaining.  
The remainder of this Comment examines the potential direct effects of 
these holdings on defense attorneys and prosecutors and predicts how future 
litigation could result in specific reforms within the plea-bargaining 
process. 
III. THE AFTERMATH OF FRYE AND LAFLER 
The holdings in Frye and Lafler reiterate defense attorneys’ existing 
ethical responsibilities to communicate to clients the existence of plea offers 
and assess the offers’ relative merits so that the clients’ decisions to accept 
or to decline pleas are informed and voluntary.  After Frye and Lafler, 
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defense attorneys could become more fastidious in advising clients of plea 
offers in a timely fashion and in encouraging them to take those offers that 
appear favorable.  This result is particularly likely for attorneys mindful of 
the possibility that the failure to persuade clients to plead guilty could result 
in ineffectiveness claims on appeal.  On the contrary, defense attorneys who 
are relatively unconcerned with the possibility of Strickland claims or who 
have come to accept those claims as inevitable consequences of their field 
of practice could become more cavalier in their approaches to the question 
of trial.  Such attorneys might then advise clients to take cases to trial when 
they face plea offers that are acceptable but not ideal.  Under Frye and 
Lafler, the remedy for heightened sentences following post-trial convictions 
would be the sentences offered during plea bargaining, while the potential 
rewards for taking the cases to trial would be acquittals. 
As for prosecutors, Frye and Lafler’s remedy for successful Strickland 
claims could result in them only making offers that they are willing to live 
with.  As they decide what offers to make, they will bear in mind that 
successful Strickland claims based on bargains that are not communicated 
to the accused could result in reopened plea offers, rather than new trials.  
This remedy could lead prosecutors to make offers that are less favorable 
for defendants and could lead to a harsher sentencing climate in general. 
If the root causes of our overcrowded criminal justice system are not 
addressed, such as the funding issues that plague both district attorneys and 
public defenders, then defendants and defense counsel could effectively 
strike by refusing to accept plea offers on those terms.200  Such actions 
would force prosecutors to either issue more lenient offers or take 
additional cases to trial.  The practice of overcharging, as well as the 
purposes it serves in expediently disposing of cases through pleas, could 
then come into the Supreme Court’s purview.  The Court has not yet 
directly confronted overcharging, but the holdings in Padilla, Frye, and 
Lafler make it more likely that it will do so in the future.201 
Prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to be successfully challenged, 
particularly with respect to the specific charges that prosecutors bring 
against defendants, as that practice is a recognized characteristic of 
prosecution.  However, prosecutors’ practice of extending exploding offers 
could be curtailed by future litigants, whose appointed counsel may be 
 
200 Similar proposals focused on public order misdemeanor charges are detailed in Jenny 
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unable to investigate the charges and provide effective representation in the 
span of a few hours.  If such short-term offers were ruled unconstitutional 
in certain types of cases—such as those involving mandatory minimum 
sentences, because they necessarily involve ineffective assistance of 
counsel—the plea-bargaining landscape would be altered.  Such a change 
would most closely resemble scholarly proposals that suggest forbidding 
plea agreements at first appearances for serious felonies.202  Defendants’ 
first appearances would be followed by a mandatory cooling-off period, 
which would allow defendants to rationally consider plea offers and would 
serve as a hedge against inevitable Strickland claims.203  Some public 
defender offices even now refuse to plead clients out at first appearances, 
whether for felonies or misdemeanors, because they recognize the pressure 
to plead and the prevalence of plea agreements at first appearances.204  By 
providing constitutional support for these practices and affirmatively stating 
that a contrary rule forces ineffective representation of counsel, judges 
could begin to further regulate plea bargaining without making wholesale 
changes that curtail prosecutorial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in Frye and Lafler that plea 
bargaining is the primary way that the criminal justice system functions 
leaves room for additional constitutional litigation concerning plea-
bargaining practices.  While the dissents raised the specter of litigation that 
would challenge prosecutorial practices and discretion, a wholesale 
challenge to prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to succeed; as a recognized 
characteristic of prosecution, prosecutorial discretion is even more 
entrenched in the legal system than plea bargaining.  However, one possible 
plea-bargaining reform could result through Strickland challenges and 
would be consistent with scholarly recommendations and the practices of 
defense attorneys who find it impossible to provide effective counsel when 
plea offers have short expiration dates.  A strategically filed Strickland 
petition in a case in which a plea agreement was only available to the 
defendant for hours at the first appearance could turn the court’s eyes to a 
practice that does more to clear cases from the docket than to secure justice. 
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In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings, if such a case reached 
the Court, it would be an easy case, along the lines of Frye and Lafler.  As 
in those cases, the Court could issue a ruling reinstating the plea offered at 
first appearance, along with a broader holding that such offers, attached to 
same-day deadlines, are unconstitutional.  If the Court altered the plea-
bargaining landscape and required a minimum period of time for initial 
offers to remain open, two possible outcomes emerge.  First, prosecutors 
could be forced to extend the deadlines for initial offers to allow for proper 
investigation and effective counsel.  Another possibility is that prosecutors 
could no longer offer pleas at first appearances.  Attorneys on both sides 
could then have additional time to investigate their cases and come to the 
negotiating table with a better understanding of the facts at issue.  Either 
one of these outcomes would increase the likelihood that the plea-
bargaining process would result in resolutions that do justice for all parties 
involved and ensure that the promises of Brady are kept. 
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